Syncretic Post, Perhaps My Best Ever Contribution to the Social Epistemological Project

I'm going to sketch this out in an effort to get it right. It'll probably be the lense through which I analyze other blogger for awhile.

1. Agent Zero: An agent popularly perceived as having the capacity to make an action-decision that affects the existential odds of the rest of us (the six billion people in our apparent reality).
2. There is an optimal action-decision Agent Zero can make. There is also a worst possible action-decision Agent Zero can make. Along this axis we popularly grade Agent Zero as hero or villian.
3. What follows are a set of Influence Agents. They are not Agent Zero, but they are either popularly perceived as having the ability to influence Agent Zero, or I define them as having the potential ability to influence Agent Zero, even if not popularly perceived, as my way of dealing with strategic framing of agents as not having the ability to (and hence possible villianous framing due to failure to) influence Agent Zero to make the optimal action-decision.
4. Bostrom-Goffman Influence Agent. This is an influence agent who sucessfully influences Agent Zero to make the optimal action-decision. (Bostrom implies motivation for the optimal decision to be made, Goffman implies following the optimal theatrical strategy for the optimal decision to be made).
5. Semmelweiss Influence Agent. A Semmelweis Agent publicly tells Agent Zero to make the (Bostrom) Optimal Action-Decision. But the Semmelweiss agent doesn't follow a Goffman Optimal consequentialist theactrical strategy, so Agent Zero does NOT make the optimal Action-Decision.
6. Heckler Influence Agent. A heckler influence agent publicaly tells Agent Zero not to make the (Bostrom) Optimal Action-Decision, and does NOT do so as part of a Goffman Optimal (double game) consequentialist theatrical strategy, so Agent Zero does NOT make the optimal Action-Decision.
7. Subsidiary Influence Agents. Primary influence agents that directly influence Agent Zero are themselves influence by subsidiary influence agents. Subsidiary influence agents can also be Bostrom-Goffman, Heckler, or Semmelweiss Agents.
8. We are all at least a subsidiary influence agent for every action-decision made in the closed set of all 6 billion people in our apparent reality.
9. Inaction by an agent, be they agent zero, a direct influence agent, or a subsidiary influence agent, is itself a default action-decision.

Moral accounting may be a bit silly, and not grounded in best of breed current scientific understanding of "free will", etc. But I think this is a better more comprehensive framework than the microsocial games played by the best living macrosocial scientists and policy optimizers that I'm aware of.

I'd appreciate being directed toward more rigorous thought on these areas than I've done here. I'm not trying to reinvent a wheel -I'd much rather find one already much better than I've got here.

EDIT: I'm thinking of calling this "The Neurotic Manifesto"